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Abstract 
LUNDQUIST, SAMUEL G. Foreign Direct Investment Response Following Intellectual 
Property Rights Reform.  
Department of Economics, June 2011. 
 
Over the past several decades, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows across the globe have 
increased markedly. During this same period, a large number of countries have strengthened 
their Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) regimes in response to global legislative changes such as 
the Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of IPRs or domestic policy initiatives. In this thesis, I 
empirically investigate the impact of IPR reform on FDI activity. I use a panel data set that 
consist of FDI flows from Germany and US into 15 host countries over a 24 year time period. As 
a proxy for IPR regime change I use the patent reform dummy developed by Branstetter et al. 
(2006, QJE). I use a difference-in-difference regression approach, accounting for fixed country 
effects and fixed time effects. I also control for GDP per-capita, GDP, real-exchange rate and 
trade openness. The results imply that following IPR reform there is a statistically significant and 
quantitatively substantial increase in FDI inflows. The findings are robust under a number of 
different specifications. In addition, I find that richer countries receive higher levels of FDI 
inflows following IPR reform using U.S parent data. However, following IPR reform, with 
German parent data indicates that richer countries receive lower levels of FDI.  
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1. Introduction 
  
Throughout modern history, intellectual creations have played a pivotal role in the 
development of the world economy. These intellectual creations have facilitated the creation of 
new technologies, advanced the quality of existing products, increased productivity, and 
improved the quality of life for society. These intellectual assets—or intellectual property (IP) —
are pieces of information or ideas that have the potential to yield economic value if they are put 
into use in a marketplace (Maskus, 2000). Over the past few decades, IP has become increasingly 
protected through expanded Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). This movement towards 
stronger IPRs was expedited through international treaties and agreements, most notably the 
Agreement of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) passed by the 
WTO in 1995.  During the TRIPS negotiations, heated debate occurred between developing and 
developed countries regarding the potential ramifications of proposed IPR reform. Many 
developing nations opposed strengthening their IPR structures, fearing their ability to acquire 
and use more sophisticated technologies from developed nations would be impeded. On the other 
hand, developed nations argued that stronger IPRs would motivate foreign firms to increase 
investments through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and thereby accelerate technological 
transfer to these developing countries. The controversial passage of the TRIPS agreement has 
motivated a rich theoretical and empirical literature regarding the effects of IPR reform on FDI. 
However, to date, this literature has yielded somewhat ambiguous and conflicting findings.  
This thesis builds on previous literature in an effort to more accurately gauge the 
response of FDI activity following significant and well defined IPR reform. To accomplish this, 
a difference-in-differences empirical approach is used to estimate the effect of IPR reform on 
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FDI activity using U.S and German FDI outflows into 15 host countries across a 24 year period.1 
A patent reform dummy—established by Branstetter (2006)—serves as a proxy for IPR reform. 
The following variables act as controls: GDP per-capita, GDP, exchange rate and trade openness. 
Country and time fixed effect variables are also used to isolate idiosyncrasies within countries 
and individual years. In addition, this paper analyzes whether FDI activity is more responsive in 
high income countries following reform. To accomplish this, two interaction terms are included 
which estimate the response of FDI relative to income, following IPR reform. 
The results from this study indicate, following IPR reform, there is a statistically 
significant increase in FDI activity in the 15 sample countries, and these results are robust under 
a number of different specifications. The results estimating FDI response depending on host 
country income level are somewhat ambiguous. More specifically, the results using U.S FDI 
outflows indicate that high income host countries receive an extra kick of FDI following reform.  
However, these results are not robust for all specifications. On the other hand, when German FDI 
outflows are examined, high income host countries receive less FDI following reform.  
 
1.1 TRIPS Agreement Overview  
 
IPR reform was the main concern of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) enacted under the Uruguay rounds of multilateral negations 
by the WTO in 1995.  The initial motivation for the agreement arose due to the “widely varying 
standards in the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights and the lack of a 
multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in 
                                                            
1 The list of host countries and reform years is provided in Table 1 of the Appendix 
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counterfeit goods have been a growing source of tension in international economic relations” 
(WTO). The goal of the TRIPs agreement was to establish a more uniform international system 
of IPRs. The provisions of the agreement set a minimum standard for the protection (and the 
enforcement) of intellectual properties. Most notably, the agreement requires WTO member 
nations to: grant patents to a broad array of innovations for a minimum of twenty years, treat 
foreign and domestic applications the same, and create new standards of enforcement—that 
provide civil and criminal penalties for infringement (WTO).  
 
1.2 IPRs in the Global Economy 
 
IPRs grant owners of certain intellectual property (IP) exclusive rights to intangible 
assets. Intellectual property includes: music, literary, and artistic work; discoveries and 
inventions; and words, phrases and symbols (Boldrin and Levine, 2002). IP is protected by 
various mechanisms including patents, copyrights, trademarks and industrial design rights which 
vary in terms of their duration of protection and the breadth of protection.  
Since the passage of TRIPS in 1995 significant convergence of IPR structures has 
occurred among developed and developing nations. From 1990 through 2005, the strength of 
IPRs increased by 29.5% for all countries.2 However, this figure is somewhat misleading 
because the majority of the increase in IPR strength came from middle to low income 
countries—excluding least developed nations (LDNs).3 For instance, in the ten years following 
the passage of TRIPS, South Korea increased its IPR measure from 3.89 to 4.33, while Mexico 
                                                            
2Figure calculated using the Park (2008) patent index. For a more complete explanation of the patent index see 
section 3.4 of the methodology chapter for a more complete explanation. 
3 LDNs have until July 2013 to meet the requirements outlined in TRIPS. See the WTO press release from 
November 29th 2005, http://www.wto.org/english/news e/pres05 e/pr424 e.htm. LDNs are defined by the United 
Nations as any country with a three year average GNI below 905 USD. 
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increased its measure from 3.14 to 3.88. Middle income countries such as these have been able to 
more effectively implement stronger IPR structures due to their greater capacity to adjust their 
systems (Park, 2008). Unlike lower income countries, middle income countries generally have 
more extensive resources available to implement stronger IPR systems. Also, these middle 
income countries may have a greater willingness to adopt stronger IPR regimes (Park, 2008). 
Grossman and Lai (2004) find that the incentive for stronger IPRs is greater in countries with 
larger market size and innovative capacity which increase the net marginal benefits of IPR 
reform. As middle income countries continue to grow, along with increased demand from 
developed countries for stronger international IPR protection, it appears IPRs are likely to 
continue to expand in scope and scale in the coming future (Sener, 2006).  
The proliferation of IPRs has not been favored by all parties. The TRIPS agreement along 
with other recent legislation to strengthen IPRs has engendered a heated debate regarding the 
relative merits of IPRs. Proponents of stronger IPRs argue that IPR reform accelerates innovation 
in the world economy and facilitates growth in developing nations (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 
2010). Developing nations, they argue benefit from increased technological transfer from 
developed nations (the North) to developing nations (the South) through increased foreign direct 
investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs). According to Branstetter, Fisman, Foley, 
and Saggi (2010), stronger IPRs could lead MNEs to expand the scope and scale of their 
operations, manufacture tech-intensive goods, and shift the production of existing goods to IPR 
reformed countries. Proponents believe these benefits offset the costs of instituting stronger 
IPRs.  These costs arise from the fact that the South had poor or ineffective IPR structures prior 
to TRIPS which lacked the institutional mechanisms required to adequately meet criteria outlined 
in the agreement. Implementation of TRIPs requires significant monetary outlays for these 
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countries to build necessary infrastructure, purchase necessary equipment, train staff, and 
establish a working system that is both, secure and enforceable for (Finger, 2000). Most 
developed nations already had satisfactory IPR systems hitherto TRIPS. Therefore, developing 
nations incurred a disproportionate amount of the costs resulting from TRIPS. 
However, stronger IPRs—argue opponents of reform—create implicit costs resulting 
from reduced competition in markets and less innovation. The South relies on technological 
diffusions from the North to increase innovation and facilitate economic growth. As a result, 
more stringent IPR structures put an increased economic burden on these countries because they 
must pay higher prices from licensing agreements to use patented technologies. Consequently, 
IPR reform leads to a transfer of rents from consumers and producers in the South to patent 
holders in the North. McCalman (2001) found that transfers of wealth caused by the passage of 
TRIPS benefit the United States, Germany, Italy, France, Sweden, and Switzerland, and 
negatively affect all other countries.  
A significant portion of the findings in the theoretical literature indicates that stronger 
IPRs are never in the interest of the South. Stronger IPR enforcement in the South causes a 
reduction in imitation by Southern firms. When Northern firms are prohibited from shifting 
production to the South via FDI, stronger IPRs in the South lead to a reduction in Northern 
innovation.4 Reduced innovation in the North reduces global welfare because the portfolio of 
available products declines (Branstetter, 2010). On the other hand, if Northern firms succesfully 
shift production to the South, reduced imitation—following the implementation of stronger IPRs 
                                                            
4 Further explanation of these findings is provided in the literature review, specifically Glass and Saggi (2002) and 
Dinopoulos and Sergerstrom (2007) on pages 11‐12 and 14 respectively. 
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in the South—causes more FDI, but harms Southern welfare because MNE produced products 
are more expensive than Southern imitators.5  
 Boldrin and Levine (2002) argue “’intellectual property’ has come to mean not only the 
right to own and sell ideas, but also the right to regulate their use.” Excessive IP protection can 
lead to “IP inefficiency” (Boldrin and Levine, 2002). This inefficiency results due to the fact that 
many patents are often held by firms as “defensive legal bargaining tools” against competition 
(Boldrin and Levine, 2002). Firms holding defensive patents can impede rival firms from 
creating higher quality products that are cheaper to produce. This harms consumers because they 
are forced to pay higher prices for inferior products.  A noteworthy example is the agriculture 
industry where defensive patents are frequently used.  In this industry, firms often use defensive 
patents to protect various types of modified seeds.6 Consequently, farmers in developing 
countries are required by law to pay licensing fees in order to use these more productive seeds.  
 
1.3 FDI in the Global Economy 
 
In the past several decades, the world economy has become significantly more inter-
connected. One consequence of this inter-connection is increased activity in foreign markets 
through FDI. FDI is the process by which a corporation, government, or individual makes a long 
term investment in a country outside of their domestic market (OECD ILibrary). However, FDI 
is not simply a monetary outlay, and can take on several different forms including: an acquisition 
of a foreign firm, building infrastructure, joint-ventures, and technology transfers (Graham and 
Spaulding, 2006).  
                                                            
5 A more thorough discussion of the theoretical literature is provided in section 2.1 of the literature review chapter 
on pages 10 through 16. 
6 See Boldrin and Levine (2002) for a more thorough discussion 
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FDI provides a vital source external capital and is an important vehicle for economic 
growth for many countries. Countries receiving inward FDI benefit in a few ways. First, inward 
FDI can lead to increased exports. Branstetter (2010) finds that increased MNE activity led to an 
increase in exports of new goods. Furthermore, FDI accelerates technological transfer from the 
North to the South, which can boost the South’s innovative capacity. However, the benefits of 
FDI do not necessarily accumulate instantaneously and evenly across countries (OECD, 2002). 
In the theoretical literature, increased FDI flows to the South are often accompanied by a decline 
in Southern imitation. The relative magnitudes of these competing forms of technology transfer 
determine the change in innovation in the South. Consequently, FDI may benefit one party more 
than the other.   
In the recent years, FDI has increased dramatically in the global economy. From 1980 to 
2008, FDI inflows in the world economy increased by over 150% or, approximately 5.2% per 
year (OECD ILibrary). Although FDI inflows to developing nations are still less than developed 
nations, inflows worldwide are beginning to become more dispersed. From 1980 to 2008 
developing countries’ share in total FDI inflows increased from 26% to 37% (OECD ILibrary). 
Figure 1 displays a graphical representation of the increases in FDI inflows in developed and 
developing countries from 1990 through 2007. 
However, FDI has not been evenly dispersed across countries and regions. Figures 2 
depict outward U.S. and German FDI into the 15 host countries examined in the empirical 
analysis of this paper. Figure 2 illustrates that FDI flows are not evenly dispersed across the 
sample countries. In addition, FDI inflows appear to be changing at different rates overtime 
between countries. For example, from 2002 through 2008 FDI inflows in China, Japan, and 
Brazil increase steadily, while FDI inflows in Argentina and the Philippines remain relatively 
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constant. Figure 2 also indicates that there are also significant changes in FDI inflows within 
countries. For example, FDI inflows in Mexico increase slightly from 1985 to 1995; however, 
from 1996 through 2008 FDI inflows increase more rapidly.  
Figure 3 provides a correlation matrix of IPR strength and inward FDI per capita for the 
15 sample countries. Examining Figure 3, there is a relatively strong positive correlation between 
inward FDI and IPR strength. However, correlation does not necessarily imply causation. 
Therefore, a more rigorous analysis of this relationship is executed in the following sections of 
this paper to determine the response FDI following IPR reform episodes in these 15 host 
countries. 
 The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 examines the related theoretical 
and empirical literature. Chapter 3 explains the data and outlines the methodology used for the 
empirical study. Chapter 4 displays the empirical results. Finally, Chapter 5 provides a few 
concluding remarks and policy recommendations. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Theoretical Literature 
 
 The theoretical literature mostly utilizes North-South production cycle models to 
investigate the impact of IPR reform on FDI, innovation, and imitation. In the model, there are 
two countries: the North and the South where the former is analogous to a developed nation 
while the later is analogous to a developing nation. Northern firms undertake R&D to create new 
or better products, while southern firms undertake imitation of Northern products. When R&D 
efforts are successful in the North, a product is developed and innovation increases. Firms in the 
North that are successful with their R&D efforts, first produce their product in the North and 
then attempt to find ways to shift production to the South, where production costs are lower. The 
transition of production from the North to the South is known as “technology transfer”. 
Successful technology transfer from the North to the South leads to multinationalization—
Northern firms become MNEs —where Northern firms shift full or partial production to the 
South through FDI. Production can also shift to the South when a Southern firm successfully 
imitates a Northern product. When innovation increases further in the North, production shifts 
back to North and the cycle starts over. This product cycle methodology is first modeled in 
Vernon (1966) and further refined by Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) 
and others. 
In the product cycle literature, multinationalization is usually both costly and risky. 
Despite these risks, technology transfer through multinationalization can also be beneficial for 
Northern firms because production costs are lower in the South. Both northern firms and MNEs 
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are subject to the risk that their product will be imitated by southern firms.7 This risk of imitation 
however, is reduced when IPRs are strengthened in the South. Glass and Saggi (2002) describe 
this reduced risk as an “imitation tax” levied on Southern firms.   
The North-South production cycle model take on two basic forms: quality-ladders and 
variety expansion. 
 
a. Quality-Ladders Model 
  
 Quality-ladders models investigate the interplay between Northern innovation and 
Southern imitation, where R&D in the North aims to improve the quality of an existing product. 
In this model, once a superior product has been created, the old product becomes obsolete and 
production shifts back to the North. The quality-ladders literature offers mixed results for the 
effect of IPR reform on FDI.  
 Glass and Saggi (2002) incorporate a North-South quality-ladders model in which 
imitation, innovation, and FDI are all endogenous, which is the first paper to incorporate these 
specifications. The authors’ findings reveal that when stronger IPRs are incorporated in the 
South, FDI decreases. Their findings indicate that Northern firms have no additional incentive to 
become MNEs because the risk of their product being imitated is the same in the North as the 
South following IPR reform.  
In this model, “technology spillover”—or the transfer of technology from the North to the 
South—occurs through two outlets: FDI and imitation. Glass and Saggi’s (2002) findings reveal 
that stronger IPRs in the South create a “resource wasting effect” and a “disincentive for 
                                                            
7 In a few of the theoretical models, such as Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) only MNEs can be imitated by 
Southern firms. 
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imitation” which deters FDI, and leads to a contraction of imitation in the South.  Imitation in the 
South is deterred following reform because the stronger IPRs have the effect of making imitation 
more costly. Imitation is more costly following reform because Southern firms have to alter their 
products so they are not as distinguishable; pay licensing fees; or incorporate reverse engineering 
to imitate Northern products. All of these examples require additional time and resources for 
imitation. As a result, imitation is more expensive; leading to a decline in production in the 
South. Production in the South declines due to the increased cost of imitation which leaves fewer 
resources available for production. This causes the “resource wasting effect”—akin to a 
contraction in Southern labor supply. This also leads to a reduction in FDI. With less production 
in the South, the North must divert some of its resources away from innovation (R&D) to 
production. This results in further “resource wasting” because the North has a comparative 
advantage in innovation. With less workers conducting R&D, innovation and FDI decline.  
 Sener (2006) develops a quality-ladders model to investigate the effect of an exogenous 
increase in Southern IPRs on endogenous innovation, imitation, and FDI. Like Glass and Saggi 
(2002), Sener (2006) also finds that stronger IPRs in the South lead to a reduction in innovation, 
imitation and FDI. The author’s model differs from previous literature in a few ways. First, at the 
steady-state equilibrium in the model, innovation, imitation and multinationalization are constant 
despite the existence of population growth. This prevents the model from being subject to scale 
effect critiques highlighted by Jones (1995). Second, the model predicts the steady-state rate of 
innovation to be a function of the proportion of resources designated to R&D. Sener’s (2006) 
model also differs from Glass and Saggi (2002) and others because his model incorporates 
fragmented production. Fragmented production allows MNEs to offshore an endogenously 
chosen portion of production to the South. So, unlike Glass and Saggi (2002)—where all MNE 
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production either shifts to the South or remains in the North—Sener (2006) allows for some 
portion of MNE production to remain in the North and some to move to the South. Finally, Sener 
(2006) incorporates rent protection activities building on the work of Dinopoulos and Syropoulos 
(2006).   
Rent protection activities allow Northern firms that successfully innovate to “safeguard” 
their innovations (Sener, 2006). These safeguards enable Northern firms to extend the duration 
of monopoly control of the market. In the Sener’s (2006) model, Northern innovators conduct 
two types of rent protection: innovation-deterring activities and imitation-deterring activities. 
Innovation-deterring activities attempt to thwart successful innovation of other Northern firms, 
while imitation-deterring activities are aimed at reducing imitation from Southern Firms.  
Sener (2006) investigates the effect of MNE activity by examining both, the aggregate 
rate of FDI and the proportion of multinational industries. The results from his model indicate 
that following IPR reform in the South, the proportion of multinational industries increases, but 
the aggregate rate of FDI declines. At the equilibrium following reform, Sener (2006) finds that 
the proportion of Northern industries declines but, the proportion of Northern industries and 
MNEs increases. This increase, leads to a decline in the fraction of aggregate Southern 
industries. The reduction in Southern industries produces a decline in imitation. However, the 
author’s findings also indicate that the fraction of production that occurs in the South within 
MNEs increases following reform. So, established MNEs expand production in the South 
following reform. 
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Building on previous literature, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) develop a North-
South quality-ladders model. Unlike previous quality-ladders models, Dinopoulos and 
Segerstrom’s (2010) model has no imitation by Southern firms. Consequently, all technology 
transfer occurs through FDI. The authors’ model demonstrates that an exogenous increase in 
Southern IPR leads to an increase in FDI. Furthermore, the authors’ results indicate that Southern 
IPR reform leads to a temporary increase in Northern innovation as well as a permanent decrease 
in the North-South wage gap.  
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) contrast these results with their previous findings in 
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, (2007) where all technological transfer from the North to the South 
occurs through imitation. The results from Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2007) yield the opposite 
results of their current study. Following an increase in IPR protection, there is a permanent 
increase in the North-South wage gap; a temporary decrease in Northern innovation; and a 
permanent decrease in Southern imitation. If technological transfer occurs through imitation 
only, stronger IPRs inhibit technological transfer because imitation of Northern products is more 
difficult and expensive. With less imitation taking place, a greater proportion of production 
occurs in the North, hindering the ability of Northern firms to innovate through R&D.  
These polar findings highlight the importance of the method of technological transfer. In 
the real world, technological transfer occurs through both imitation and FDI. So the effects of 
IPR reform hinge on the relative importance of each method of technological transfer. 
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 b. Variety Expansion Model 
 
In North-South variety expansion production models, Northern innovators conduct R&D 
in effort to create new varieties of products, in contrast to quality-ladders models, where R&D 
attempts to create a higher quality product. The theoretical literature incorporating variety 
expansion models indicates—conclusively—that an exogenous increase in Southern IPRs leads 
to increased FDI flows.  
Helpman (1993) is the first to use a variety expansion model to investigate the effects of 
stronger IPRs on FDI flows. The author’s model incorporates endogenous FDI with exogenous 
imitation and innovation. The results elucidate that following IPR reform in the South, 
multinationalization increases. Lai (1998) furthers Helpman’s (1993) study by allowing for 
endogenous FDI and innovation while keeping imitation exogenous. Lai’s (1998) model, like 
Helpman (1993), finds that IPR reform in the South causes an increase in MNE activity and FDI. 
Using a North-South variety expansion model, Branstetter’s et al. (2009) findings are 
consistent with Helpman (1993) and Lai (1998). Their results show that imitation in the South 
decreases following IPR reform, however, the increases in FDI (via MNEs) is greater than this 
decline in imitation. Consequently, the South’s share in global manufacturing increases because 
the increased production from MNEs more than compensates for the decline in Southern 
imitative production. The South’s increased share in global manufacturing indicates that net 
production shifts from North to South freeing up more resources in the North to conduct R&D. 
With more resources available for R&D, innovation increases. Higher rates of innovation 
facilitate increased global welfare.  
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The findings in Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) are also consistent with previous 
variety expansion literature. Like previous variety expansion literature, Gustafsson and 
Segerstrom (2010) find that IPR reform leads to faster technology transfer within MNEs and 
higher consumer welfare in both the North and South in the long-run. The authors’ model adds to 
the previous literature by incorporating costly technology transfer. The authors also remove the 
effects of country size on technology transfer and long-term growth which alleviates potential 
scale effects. 
 
2.2 Empirical Literature 
 
 The empirical analysis in this paper is most closely associated with the work of 
Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010). Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010) conduct an empirical difference-in-
differences analysis in an effort to determine the response of U.S. based MNEs and domestic 
industrial production following significant and well defined IPR reform in 16 countries from 
1982 through 1999. The authors’ create a patent reform dummy as a proxy for IPR reform that 
equals zero prior to the year of reform and one following reform.8 This patent reform dummy is 
used in the same manner for the empirical analysis in this paper. 
Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010) first examine the response of technology transfer from 
parent firms to affiliates following IPR reform. Using surveys of MNE managers, the authors 
find that technology transfer within MNEs “is sensitive to the perceived strength of IPR 
structure” (Branstetter et al., 2010, pg. 13). When MNEs transfer sensitive technologies to their 
affiliates, they must often instruct skilled local labor on how the technology works. This creates a 
                                                            
8 See section 3.3 of the methodology chapter for a more complete description of the Branstetter (2006) (2010) 
patent reform dummy. 
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potential risk for MNEs because local workers can leave the firm with the technological 
knowledge and join a local firm. If IPRs are weak, MNEs can do little to prevent local labor from 
exploiting this technology. However, if IPRs are strong, MNEs can prevent this barratry by 
preventing other firms from using their patented materials. From this intuition, Branstetter et al. 
(2006, 2010) suggest that following IPR reform, the value of technological flows is greater under 
stricter IPR regimes.  
To measure the value of technological flows, the authors use the volume of intra-firm 
royalty payments (payments made by affiliates in a host country to their parent corporation for 
the right to use parent intangible assets) for intangible assets as a proxy for technology transfer. 
The authors then conduct a difference-in-differences regression analysis. The dependent variable 
is log affiliate royalty payments and the key independent variable is the patent reform dummy 
described above. The authors control for a few country and time fixed effects. In addition, 
Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010) also control for a number of host country characteristics including: 
corporate tax rate, withholding tax rate, inward FDI restrictions, capital controls, trade openness, 
and GDP per capita. 
The authors’ results estimate that intra-firm royalty payments increase by 16% following 
reform. Not surprisingly, these results are greatest for U.S. MNEs that make frequent use of 
patents prior to reform. This makes intuitive sense because the potential value of technology 
flows is greater for these firms. Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010) find that these firms are most often 
technologically intensive firms. For these tech-intensive firms, there is a 34% increase in affiliate 
royalty payments. The authors’ note however, that an increase in royalty payments could be due 
to an increase in the price charged for the technology from royalty payments. So, the authors 
conduct a second specification that measures the value of technology flows. 
17 
 
Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010) next analyze the response of affiliate R&D spending 
following IPR reform to confirm their results in the first specification. R&D conducted by 
affiliates in developing countries (the majority of the authors’ sample are developing countries) 
is mostly concerned with absorbing parent country technology and its modification for local 
markets. (Branstettter et al., 2010, pg. 10) Consequently, changes in affiliate R&D in these 
countries is a good proxy for technology transfer.  Following IPR reform, the authors’ results 
estimate that R&D spending by affiliates increases by 9% for all firms and by 34% for tech 
intensive firms. 
Branstetter et al. (2010) extend their previous analysis by examining disaggregated U.S. 
trade statistics. Building on previous research, the authors construct an annual calculation of the 
number of initial export episodes.9 The authors find that initial exports to the U.S. increase 
noticeably following reform. This increase, the authors suggest, lead to an expansion of the range 
of goods and services being produced by MNEs and other non-imitative firms in reforming 
countries dominates the decline in indigenous innovation following reform. This notion further 
strengthens the authors’ previous theoretical findings that IPR reform expands Southern 
industrial production.10  The empirical results estimate a 27% increase in exports to the U.S. 
from host countries following reform. U.S. exports from tech intensive firms are even more 
responsive to IPR reform, increasing by 32%. The authors’ findings, in total, illustrate a 
statistically significant and quantitatively substantial increase in MNE activity and domestic 
industrial production following IPR reform.  
 
                                                            
9 This figure is calculated as the number of 10‐digit commodities for which recorded U.S. imports from a given 
Host country exceed zero for the first time in the data. See Branstetter (2010) pgs. 3‐4 for more details. 
10 See Branstetter et al. (2009) 
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Schneider (2005) examines the effect of IPRs, FDI, and high-tech trade on a country’s 
growth and innovation rates. To conduct this empirical analysis, the author uses a panel data set 
of 47 developed and developing countries in four, five year periods from 1970 through 1990. 
The author’s first specification regress the change in innovation growth against IPR strength, 
FDI inflows, human capital levels, infrastructure levels, and R&D expenditures. The results 
estimate that FDI inflows do not have a statistically significant effect on innovation growth. In 
the first specification, the results also show that IPR protection has a statistically significant 
effect on innovation growth; however, this impact is only significant for developed countries and 
may even negatively affect innovation in developing countries.  These results suggest that the 
growth in innovation in the North following reform dominates the decline in imitation in the 
South following reform. Consequently, foreign firms (the North) benefit at the expense of local 
firms (the South).   
In the second specification, Schneider (2005) examines the effect of IPR strength, FDI 
inflows, physical capital stock, innovation rate, and growth rate of high-tech imports on the 
growth rate of GDP per capita (economic growth). The author’s findings estimate that IPR 
strength has a statistically significant impact on GDP per capita growth for all countries.  These 
findings are consistent with previous empirical literature such as Gould and Gruben (1996) 
which also find a positive and statistically significant impact of IPR strength on growth. The 
results indicate that countries stand to benefit from IPR reform because they experience higher 
subsequent growth rates. Finally, the author’s results estimate that FDI inflows positively impact 
GDP per capita growth in developed countries only. This implies that FDI inflows lead to 
economic growth only in countries that have achieved a minimum threshold of economic well-
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being (i.e. the North). Consequently, according to Schneider’s (2005) findings, increased FDI 
inflows to the South do not increase the South’s economic growth rate.   
Smarzynska (2004) examines the composition of firm-level FDI inflows following IPR 
reform in 24 former Soviet Union countries from 1989 through 1994. The author’s data set 
allows for a unique natural experiment because under Soviet rule, these countries were almost 
completely closed to FDI. In the first specification, Smarzynska (2004) regresses FDI against 
IPR strength. As a measure of IPR strength, the author uses the patent reform index created by 
Ginarte and Park (1997).11 In addition, the author also controls for firm and country specific 
explanatory variables. The results indicate that firms are likely to invest in countries with 
stronger IPRs and these results are especially significant for firms in high technology sectors. 
These firms stand to benefit most from reform because they tend to hold a higher number of 
patents. 
In her second specification, Smarynska (2004) tests whether FDI inflows following 
reform are manufacturing or distributing intensive. To test this inquiry, the author constructs a 
FDI dummy variable that equals one in the case that FDI is from manufacturing and zero 
otherwise. The author uses the same controls as the first specification. The results from 
specification two find that when IPRs are weak, firms tend to undertake projects that focus on 
distribution. Conversely, when IPRs are strong, firms are more likely to invest in projects that 
focus on manufacturing. Firms conduct manufacturing when IPRs are strong because more 
sensitive materials are transmitted to affiliates. Consequently, a stronger IPR regime better 
ensures that these materials will not be imitated.  
 
 
                                                            
11 For a detailed explanation of the Park (1997), see section 3.3 of the Methodology chapter 
20 
 
3. Methodology 
 
 
3.1. Data 
 
 The empirical analysis in this paper utilizes cross-country data from 15 host countries 
over a period of 24 years—from 1985-2008 found in Table 1.12 The panel data is pooled to 
include all countries in each specification to increase sample size. Regressions 1-3 in 
specification 1 incorporate unbalanced pooled data because the data for some of the countries is 
not complete (see footnote 10). In regression 4 of specification 1, these countries are dropped to 
create a balanced pool to check for robustness.  
 
a. Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 As a measure for FDI, U.S. and German outward FDI data, measured in millions of U.S. 
dollars is compiled for each of the fifteen sample countries. The FDI data is provided by the 
United States and Germany as reported in the OECD International Direct Investment Database.13 
To illustrate the percentage change in FDI rather than the magnitude, the FDI data is logged. To 
increase the robustness of the results two parent countries FDI outflows are examined. The 
United States and Germany are the two parent countries chosen for a two reasons. First, both of 
these countries had significant outward FDI to each of the 15 host countries prior to IPR reform. 
                                                            
12 See Table 1 for list of countries. U.S. data range is from 1985 through 2008 for all host countries examined 
excluding:  Colombia and Venezuela (no 1985‐1989 data); Indonesia (no 2002‐2004 data); and Portugal (no 1989 
data). Germany Data range is from 1985‐2008 for all host countries excluding Columbia (No 2002 data) and the 
Philippines (no 2006‐2008 data).  These years were either not reported or were confidential. 
13 <http://www.oecd‐ ilibrary.org/finance‐and‐investment/data/oecd‐international‐direct‐investment‐
statistics_idi‐data‐en>. 
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Second, Germany and the United States are the only two countries in the OECD that adequately 
reported their FDI statistics in all 15 of the host countries examined. 
 
b. Patent reform dummy 
 
To measure IPR reform, the patent reform dummy created by Branstetter et al. (2006, 
2010) is used. As mentioned in earlier, the value of the dummy takes a value of 0 prior to the 
year of reform and a value of 1 following reform (including the year of reform). Their sample 
includes 16 countries that experienced a significant patent reform episode in 1982 through1999. 
In this paper, the same 16 countries as Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010) are analyzed with the 
exception of Taiwan because appropriate FDI data was not available for Taiwan. The list of 
countries and their year of reform are all listed in Table 1. Branstetter et al. (2006) classified 
each reform based on whether or not the country strengthened or expanded patent rights based on 
five criteria: 
 
1: An expansion of the range of goods eligible for patent protection 
2: An expansion in the effective scope of patent protection 
3: An increase in the length of patent protection 
4: An improvement in the enforcement of patent rights 
5: An improvement in the administration of the patent system 
 
Expansion of patentable products. According to Branstetter et al. (2006), most of the 
reforms in the sample extended the scope of patent reforms in pharmaceuticals, agro-chemicals, 
veterinarian drugs, and food stuffs. In addition, most of the host countries examined does not 
have universal healthcare systems that control the price and availability of pharmaceutical drugs 
(Branstetter, 2006, A.2.1). Consequently, patent holders should have greater incentive to invest 
(through FDI) in host countries with stronger product patent protection. 
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Expansion in Scope of Patent Protection. Increases in the scope of a single patent are 
common among the host countries in the sample (Branstetter et al., 2006, A.2.1). These increases 
in scope take on a few different forms. Branstetter et al. (2006) indicate that some of the sample 
countries began using the concept of “infringement through equivalence” which states that 
anything that is functionally equivalent to a patented invention or idea is infringing on that patent 
(Branstetter et al., 2006, A.2.1). Without infringement through equivalence firms can avoid 
infringement by making only minute changes to patented products, even though the product still 
serve the same purpose as the patented one.14An expansion in scope of patent protection gives 
patent holders more control and freedom which should lead to higher FDI flows in countries that 
expand patent scope. 
Increase in the length of patent protection. Branstetter et al. (2006) finds that increase in 
patent length for sample countries was common, generally increasing to twenty years from the 
date of application. These increases in patent length affect all varieties of inventions. However, 
Branstetter et al. (2006) inquires that extended patent length may not affect inventions in areas 
like information technology where innovation is quite rapid. Consequently, inventions in these 
industries are likely to become obsolete quickly and well before patents expire. However, for 
patents covering inventions for things like pharmaceutical drugs which require long clinical trials 
and significant R&D, extended patent length is likely to be very beneficial. Therefore, MNEs 
should have greater incentive to invest in countries that have extended the length of patent 
protection. 
Increase in patent rights enforcement. The aforementioned changes in patents rights are 
rather useless if they are not effectively enforced. Branstetter et al. (2006) examines several 
                                                            
14 See section A2 of the appendix in Branstetter et al. (2006) for more discussion on the expansion in patent 
protection scope. 
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factors to determine if enforcement improved expanded to include: “the establishment of 
stronger penalties for patent infringement, reversal of the burden of proof in patent infringement 
lawsuits from the patent holder to the alleged infringer, changes in judicial guidelines for 
determining infringement that favored patent holders, the establishment of specialized courts or 
regulatory bodies to handle patent disputes, and the expansion of legal remedies available to the 
patent holder when the relevant legal authority determined that infringement had taken place.” 
These enforcement reforms are common in most of the sample countries.15 All of these changes 
in patent rights enforcement increase the likelihood that patent holders can successfully defend 
their invention against infringement. So, MNEs should have greater incentive to invest in these 
countries.16 
Improvement in patent rights administration. Better administrative capabilities increase 
the efficiency of the patent process and help to ensure that enforcement of patent rights is 
effective. Improved administrative capabilities occur through a variety of ways in the sample 
countries including: the establishment of a new administration to operate the patent system, an 
increase in resources to higher more administrators, and the abolition of procedures that 
increased inefficiency (Branstetter et al., 2006, A.2.1). Table 2 indicates whether each of the 15 
reform episodes implement significant changes in these five areas.17 
These 15 host countries are included in Branstetter’s et al. (2006) analysis because they 
all experienced a significant patent reform during the period of study (see Table 2). In addition, 
                                                            
15 Branstetter (2006) note, based on substantial anecdotal evidence, enforcement in China and Argentina may not 
be as strong as it is stated. So, Branstetter (2006) and this paper include specifications without these countries to 
test for robustness. 
16 Although Branstetter (2006) does note that litigation costs are also much higher following these enforcement 
reforms. Therefore, the net change in FDI could be ambiguous depending on the expected costs from these 
litigations. See Branstetter (2006) Appendix section A.2.1 for further discussion. 
17 See section A‐3 of the Appendix in Branstetter (2006) for a comprehensive overview of individual patent reform 
episodes in each of the 15 host countries in the sample.  
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these countries all had significant levels of U.S. MNE affiliate activity prior to reform. As is 
illustrated in Table 2, the sample countries have a high degree of homogeneity in regard to the 
nature of their patent reform, with 15 out of 16 experiencing a strengthening/increase in at least 4 
of the 5 criteria stated above.  
The Branstetter et al. (2006) reform dummy is not the only method available to measure 
IPR reform. Ginarte and Park (1997) created an IPR index that measures the strength and scope 
of patent protection. This index is updated to include more recent data in Park (2008). The index 
is the un-weighted sum of five separate scores for: coverage, membership in international 
treaties, duration of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and restrictions (Park 2008, pg. 1). 
One benefit of the Park (2008) index is that it can measure changes in strength of IPR reform 
explicitly. Although the Park (2008) index gives an absolute measure of the strength of IPRs it 
has a number of short-comings for panel-data analysis. First, the Park (2008) index data is 
compiled into five year averages so, yearly data cannot be examined. As a result, gradual IPR 
reform cannot be effectively measured. In addition, the averaged data significantly limits the 
number of observations which could affect the robustness of the results.  Furthermore, fixed 
effects cannot be effectively used using this measure.  
The most noteworthy short-coming regarding the Park (2008) index however, is that it 
does not include a measure for effective enforcement. The Park (2008) index relies on the 
reporting of enforcement techniques from host countries which are often manipulated. So—when 
using the Park (2008) index—a country with a strong IPR score but does not effectively enforce 
their IPR regime produces an artificially high IPR score. With this artificially high IPR score, 
results are likely to be understated.  
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It should be acknowledged that the patent reform dummy methodology does have a few 
trivial shortcomings. For example, if a country reforms its patent system gradually over the 
course of a few years, the nuances of this change may not be fully estimated in the results. 
However, in Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010), the author’s test for these possibilities by consulting 
alternate reform years for some of the sample countries based on studies by Maskus (2000) and 
Qian (2004) and find their results are robust under these specifications. In addition, this is also 
the case for the Park (2008) index. Another short-coming of the Branstetter (2006) reform 
dummy is the degree to which countries strengthen or expand their patent system is also lost 
when using a dummy variable. However, because the patent reforms in the sample countries are 
fairly homogenous (see Table 2) the relative strength of reform is likely to be similar among this 
sample. Finally, the Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010) reform dummy enables country fixed effects 
to be used which control for time invariant and country specific omitted variables that are hard to 
measure; that are correlated with the strength of IPR in the cross-section; and variables omitted 
from the study (Branstetter et al., 2010, pg. 19).  
 
 c. Control Variables 
 
 In the empirical analysis four control variables—log GDP, log GDP per capita, trade 
openness and log real exchange rate—are included which are likely to have an effect on host 
country FDI inflows. Table 4 provides a list of the control variables, along with a brief 
description, the expected coefficient, and the data source from which the variables are derived. 
The expected interpretation for the log GDP coefficient is positive. Jaumotte’s (2004) 
empirical analysis finds that greater market size (i.e. GDP) leads to a statistically significant 
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increase in FDI.  The intuition behind this is that countries with larger gross domestic products 
are likely to have more diversified economies which afford MNEs more potential investment 
options.  
 Log GDP per capita and FDI are expected to have a positive relationship. High income 
countries are likely to receive greater inflows of FDI for a few reasons. First, Schneider’s (2005) 
results indicate that FDI is often constrained through lack of infrastructure in developing 
countries. This makes intuitive sense because better infrastructure is likely to enable more 
efficient transportation of goods which increases the efficiency of investment. A second reason 
why the expected coefficient for GDP per capita is positive is because the work force in high 
income countries is likely to be more educated compared to low income countries. Schneider 
(2005), following the work of Stern et al. (2000) views GDP per capita as a proxy for a country’s 
individual stock of knowledge.  In accordance with this notion, Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef 
(2001) find that greater availability of local skilled labor leads to an increase in inward FDI. 
With a greater abundance of skilled workers MNEs can more effectively train local workers 
often times at a lower cost than importing foreign skilled labor.  
 The expected sign of the trade openness coefficient is positive. The relationship between 
FDI and trade openness is somewhat complex because the determinants of FDI are likely to 
differ depending on the type of FDI. For example, Taylor’s (2002) empirical findings indicate 
that trade openness and inward FDI are positively correlated, but only statistically significant at 
lower thresholds for FDI in the manufacturing sector. However, unlike Taylor (2002), the 
analysis in this paper uses aggregate FDI statistics so these discrepancies will not appear in the 
trade openness coefficient estimate. So, the estimated coefficient could potentially be 
insignificant. This is the case in Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010) because trade openness is not 
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robust under some specifications. Other studies however, have established a stronger correlation 
between FDI and trade openness at the aggregate level. Aizenman and Noy (2006) find that FDI 
activity is greater in countries with less trade restrictions. The intuition behind these findings is 
that countries more open to trade are likely to have more established ports and shipping 
infrastructure as well as fewer trade barriers.  
 The expected interpretation of the log real exchange rate coefficient is negative. Real 
exchange rate measures the amount of host country currency forgone for a single U.S. dollar (or 
single Euro for Germany). So, the expected coefficient for real exchange rate is likely to be 
negative because as host country currency depreciates in value relative to parent country 
currency (real exchange decreases), parent country currency becomes more valuable relative to 
host country currency. Consequently, each dollar of FDI invested in a host country is more 
valuable. Therefore, MNEs have a greater incentive to invest in these host countries. This 
intuition is supported by the findings in Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010) and others. 
In addition to the variables mentioned above, country and time fixed effects are also 
included in the empirical analysis. These fixed effects isolate any idiosyncrasies that occur 
within host countries or in an individual year which are not captured by the other control 
variables.  
 
d. Interaction Terms 
 
 To estimate FDI response depending on host country income, two alternative interaction 
terms are included in this analysis. The first interaction term combines the reform dummy 
variable with a high income dummy variable. The high income dummy takes the value 0 if a host 
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country is a low income country and takes the value 1 if a host country is a high income country. 
So, for example, a post IPR reform high income country will take on the value 1, while a post 
IPR reform low income country will take on the value 0. Table 4 provides a list of host countries 
separated into high and low income countries. Countries are designated as high or low income 
based on the 2009 World Bank threshold for high income countries. For the year 2009, the 
World Bank defines a high income country as a nation with a Gross National Income per capita 
of $12,196. Using this criterion, 8 of the sample countries are defined as high income and 7 are 
defined as low income countries. However, at the time of reform, some of these “high income” 
countries had significantly lower GDP per capita levels (in real terms). Taking this notion into 
account, three countries (Mexico, Chile and Turkey) are moved to the low income group. 
Therefore there are a total of 5 high income countries and 10 low income countries. 18 
Regardless, the criterion for the high income interaction term is somewhat arbitrary so, the 
estimated results are likely to be relatively trivial. Therefore, a second, alternative interaction 
term is also included.  
 The second interaction term is used as an alternative specification to enhance the analysis 
and check for robustness. This interaction term combines the reform dummy and the log GDP 
per capita variable described in the previous section. Therefore, the interaction variable 
coefficient indicates the response of FDI—following IPR reform—depending on income. In 
other words, the interaction terms tests whether FDI response is higher or lower as host country 
income increases. 
 
 
 
                                                            
18 High Income Countries include: Japan, Spain, Korea, Portugal, and Argentina. Low income countries include: 
Mexico, Chile, and Turkey Venezuela, Brazil, Columbia, Thailand, China, Indonesia, and The Philippines. See notes 
in Table 4 of the appendix for more details. 
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3.2. Empirical Specifications 
 
 
 
In order to determine the effect of IPRs on host country inward FDI, a difference-in-
differences regression analysis is used.  In the first specification, outward U.S. FDI into the 15 
sample countries found in Table 1 is used. 19 In the second specification, methodology remains 
the same except outward German FDI data is used. As mentioned above, 15 host countries are 
analyzed in both specifications. The third specification estimates the response of FDI depending 
on host country income following IPR reform using both alternative interaction terms. Host 
countries are examined across time and the basic empirical analysis tests whether FDI inflows 
change following IPR reform. The Branstetter et al. (2006) patent reform dummy—introduced 
above—captures the effect of IPR reform on host country FDI. So, the reform dummy coefficient 
(β1) will indicate the change in FDI following reform. Equation 1 introduces the basic 
specification: 
 
 
 
Equation 1: 
 
logFDIt,i,p=β0 + β1*Reft,i + β2* logGDPpercapt,i + β3*logExratet,i + β4*Opennesst,i + Ψi + θt + εt,i 
 
 
In equation 1, Reft,i is the Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010) patent reform dummy, which is equal to 
0 prior to the reform year and equal to 1 following reform (including year of reform) in country i 
at time, t.  For example, Indonesia reformed in 1991, so from 1985-1990 the patent reform 
dummy equals 0 and from 1991-2008 the patent reform dummy equals 1. LogGDPpercapt,i 
                                                            
19 Note: some regressions drop some host countries from the data. For example, when running regressions to get 
balanced pool data for U.S. FDI, Columbia, Venezuela, Indonesia, and Portugal because these countries are missing 
a few observations. 
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stands for log host country GDP per capita. LogExratet,i represents the log real exchange rate 
between host country i and parent country, p. Opennesst,i stands for represents the trade openness 
index of host country i.  In addition, t represents time in years, i represents host country, p 
indicates the parent country, Ψi captures the fixed effects for country i, θt captures the fixed time 
effects in year t and εt,i is the error term. The descriptive statistics for specification 1 are listed in 
Table 5. 
An examination of the descriptive statistics in Table 5 indicates United States FDI 
outflows to Japan in 2008 are approximately $101.9 billion which is the maximum for the 
sample. Maximum German FDI outflows are in Spain in 2008, receiving approximately $37.3 
billion. Minimum outward FDI flows for Germany and the United States are $88 million—to 
Chile in 1985—and $10.8 million—to Thailand in 1986—respectively. Average FDI flows for 
the period are approximately $12.9 billion and $3 billion for the United States and Germany 
respectively.  
The equation used in specification 3, takes the form of Equation 2 with the addition of the 
interaction variable. Two interaction variables are used to extend robustness. 20   
 
Equation 2: 
 
logFDIt,i,p= β0 + β1*Reft,i + β2*Reft,i*logGDPpct,i  + β3*logGDPt,i  + β4*Exratet,i + β5*Opent,i +Ψi+θt+ε t,i 
    (Reft,i*HighIncomet,i) 
 
Where Reft,i*logGDPpercapt,i  and Reft,i*HighIncomet,i  represents the interaction terms. 
LogGDPt,i represents the log GDP per capita in host country and all other variables remain the 
same as in equation 1.  
                                                            
20 The two interaction terms are not both included in the model together included separately. 
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4: Empirical Results 
 
 
4.1: Outward U.S. FDI Response Following IPR Reform   
 
 Table 6 shows the results when logged United States outward FDI is the dependent 
variable. The estimated magnitude of the change in FDI resulting from IPR reform— controlling 
for log GDP per capita, trade openness, and log real exchange rate— is captured by the reform 
dummy variable coefficient. Column 1 provides the results when no time or country fixed effects 
are used. The coefficient of the reform dummy is positive and statistically significant at 1%. The 
reform dummy coefficient indicates that FDI inflows increase by 108% following IPR reform. 
However, the “fit” of the model is not strong.  The interpretation of the R-squared statistic is one 
way to determine whether the model effectively “fits” the data. The R-squared statistic indicates 
the extent to which the variability in the dependent variable is accounted for in the model.21 The 
R-Squared is 0.49 in column 1 indicating that approximately 49% of the variation in FDI is 
explained by the variation in the independent variables. Consequently, about half of the variation 
in FDI is unexplained by the model. To improve the fit of the model, fixed effects are added. 
Column 2 provides the results with the reform dummy and fixed country and time effects but the 
other controls are dropped. However, an R-squared of 0.21 indicates that these variables, by 
themselves, only explain about 21% of the variation in FDI.  
 Column 4 provides the results for the estimated change in U.S. FDI outflows resulting 
from IPR reform, when log GDP per capita, trade openness, log real exchange rate and fixed 
country and time effects are controlled for. The estimated coefficient of the reform dummy is 
                                                            
21 Halcoussis, 2005. PG. 57 
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positive, and statistically significant at 10%. The reform dummy coefficient indicates that FDI 
flows increase by approximately 12% following reform controlling for all other independent 
factors. These results indicate that IPR reform causes a fairly significant response in FDI. So, for 
example, following IPR reform in Japan in 1986, FDI inflows from the U.S are estimated to 
increase by $221 million due to IPR reform. The dependent variable is measured in log form so 
the estimated reform dummy coefficient indicates that a semi-elastic interpretation.  The control 
variable coefficients are all statistically significant at various thresholds and are consistent with 
their expected interpretations.  The R-squared statistic is 0.94 indicating that about 94% of the 
variation in FDI is explained by the independent variables in the model. The significant increase 
in the R-squared term—from 0.49 to 0.94—when fixed country and time effects are combined 
with the control variables indicates that the majority of the variation in FDI is now explained by 
the data.  
 The results from specification 1 are robust under a few tests. In column 5, coefficients are 
not significantly changed when Columbia, Venezuela, Indonesia, and Portugal are dropped from 
the analysis. These countries are dropped because the data sets for these countries are not 
complete (see footnote 10). Consequently, when these countries are dropped from the observed 
data a balanced pool can be examined. The results in column 5 indicate that all independent 
variables coefficients are consistent with their expected interpretations and statistically 
significant at 1%. In addition, the reform dummy coefficient increases to 0.25 and is significant 
at 1%. There is a large variation in the results from specification 1. However, the results in 
columns 4 and 5 are the most effective because they provide the best fit, and therefore are likely 
to be more accurate estimations. As an alternative specification, German outward FDI flows are 
analyzed to test for robustness. 
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4.2 Outward German FDI Response following IPR Reform 
 
 Table 7 provides the results when log German FDI outflows is the dependent variable. 
The results in columns 1-4 are quantitatively similar to those found in the previous specification. 
Column 4 provides the results when all control variables and fixed country and time effects are 
included. In column 4, the estimated coefficient of the reform dummy is 0.23, statistically 
significant at 5%, and has a semi-elastic interpretation. The estimated coefficient for the reform 
dummy indicates that FDI inflows in host country i are expected to increase by 23% due to IPR 
reform in host country i. This is similar to the results estimated under the same specifications for 
U.S. FDI. Log GDP per capita and trade openness also had a statistically significant effect—at 
1%—on FDI. Interestingly however, the estimated coefficient for log GDP per capita has a 
negative interpretation. In other words, wealthier countries are expected to receive less FDI 
holding all other independent variables constant.  
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4.3 FDI Response Relative to Host Country Income  
 
 
 Table 8 lists the results for the response of FDI due to reform when interaction terms are 
included. The estimated interpretation of the interaction term coefficient which combines the 
reform dummy and the high income dummy indicates the additional amount of FDI inflows a 
high income country receives following reform. Columns 1-3 provide the results using this 
interaction term where log U.S. FDI outflows is the dependent variable. Column 1 shows the 
results when no fixed time effects are used. In column 1, the estimated coefficient for the 
interaction term is 0.34, statistically significant at 5%, and has a semi-elastic interpretation. The 
interaction term coefficient indicates high income countries receive an extra kick of FDI 
following reform. More specifically, high income countries receive an additional 34% increase in 
FDI flows following reform.  
However, when time fixed effects are included in column 2, the coefficient for the 
interaction term declines to 0.18 and statistical significance is falls to 10%. But, the R-squared 
statistic increases from 0.84 to 0.93. These results remain relatively unchanged when normal 
pool data is used. Interestingly, the results in column 2 and 3 indicate that the coefficient for the 
reform dummy (by itself) is not significant. The reform dummy coefficient—when the 
interaction is included—still continues to illustrate the response on FDI for all host countries. 
Consequently, the results in columns 2-3 estimate that there is not a statistically significant 
response in FDI following reform for all the sample countries. However, high income countries 
receive an extra kick of FDI. When the alternative interaction term is introduced in column 4, the 
interaction coefficient loses its statistical significance as well. This calls into question the 
robustness of the results. To check further for robustness Germany FDI outflows are also 
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examined to determine whether these results are consistent in countries other than the United 
States. 
 Columns 5-7 in Table 8 present the results when Log German FDI outflows are the 
dependent variable. Column 5 provides the results when no fixed time effects are used and 
column 6 when fixed time effects are added. The estimated interaction coefficients in columns 5 
and 6 are -0.36 and -0.58 respectively, and both coefficients are also statistically significant at 
5% and 1% threshold. These results estimate that high income countries are actually negatively 
affected in terms of FDI response following reform. As indicated in column 7, these results 
continue to be robust with the alternative interaction term. Although the alternative interaction 
term is lower (in absolute value terms) than in the previous example, it remains negative and 
statistically significant at 1%. In addition, the fit of the model in column 7 remains the same as in 
column 6, with an R-squared of 0.94.  
 The results for FDI based on income looking at both the U.S. and Germany produce 
inconclusive findings. These differing responses could be due to differing preferences of MNEs 
in the two countries. In addition, they also could result due to the arbitrary nature of the 
interaction terms which can potentially cause a selection bias to occur. This selection bias may 
occur because the sample countries are not grouped in an arbitrary fashion. Therefore, the results 
could potential differ depending on the criteria used. To this author’s knowledge no other similar 
studies incorporate a similar methodology so a comparative analysis cannot be undertaken. 
However, these explanations are not thoroughly examined in this paper, so a definitive inquiry 
cannot be made. 
 
 
 
36 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
 
 Applying the models created in the theoretical literature to a real world setting, and 
building on previous empirical work by Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010), this thesis attempts to 
show how FDI activity responds to significant and well defined patent reforms in 15 sample 
countries.  The findings from this paper reveal that following the implementation of IPR reform, 
FDI increases in a statistically significant manner in the sample countries. Furthermore, these 
findings are robust under a number of different specifications. However, FDI inflows are not 
uniform across all host countries examined. It appears that some countries may possibly benefit 
more from reform depending on their level of income. However, these results are mixed 
depending on the parent country examined and in some cases insignificant. Therefore, income 
level of the recipient country may not have a statistically significant on FDI inflows.  
  The results from this paper indicate that IPR reform leads to a subsequent growth in 
inward FDI for the host countries examined. However, this paper does not examine the effect of 
IPR reform on domestic firms. So, the results do not suggest that just because inward FDI 
increases, does not mean that one can extrapolate that welfare also increases in these countries. It 
could be the case that increased FDI following reform is offset by a decline in domestic imitation 
which negatively affects Southern firms at the expense of MNEs. This is highlighted in the 
theoretical literature by the duality of technology transfer between innovation (through FDI) and 
imitation.  So, in essence technology transfer from the North to the South depends on the 
magnitude of increased FDI vs. decreased imitation. If increased FDI more than compensates for 
the decline in imitation in the South following reform, than overall welfare increases and vice 
versa.  When constructing potential policies regarding IPRs in an international setting, policy 
makers must consider this trade-off between innovation and imitation incentives following IPR 
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reform. Policy makers must also consider the cost of implementing IPR reform which falls 
disproportionately on developing countries.22 Therefore, policy may want to consider the 
possibility of transferring some of these costs to applicable developed nations.  
The results in this paper are consistent with the findings of Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010) 
which examine the response of U.S. MNE activity—at the firm level—following patent reform 
in the same host countries examined in this analysis. This thesis differs slightly from 
Branstetter’s et al. (2006, 2010) because it takes a more macro approach by analyzing aggregate 
FDI activity rather than industry level data. Branstetter’s et al. (2006, 2010) findings indicate that 
technology transfer increases following host country IPR reform. The empirical analysis in this 
paper is similar in this regard, but applies a more macro approach by looking at the response of 
aggregate U.S. and German FDI activity following host country IPR reform. This paper also 
extends the sample of the Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010) analysis to include German parent data. 
The results from this paper and Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010) indicate an increase in technology 
transfer occurs following IPR reform. However, neither this paper, nor Branstetter et al. (2006, 
2010) examines the imitative response of domestic firms following reform. Therefore, the 
results—from this paper and Branstetter et al. (2006, 2010)—only indicate a gross increase in 
technology transfer.  
This study can be extended in a number of ways. First, this paper, as previously 
mentioned, does not examine the response of domestic imitative firms; therefore, conclusions 
cannot be drawn regarding the net effect of technology transfer. Further studies in the future 
could include a measure for the effect of IPR reform on these firms as well. In addition, the 
                                                            
22  See Park, 2008 
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sample size for both host and parent countries could be enlarged to determine whether the 
findings in this paper are applicable to a larger group of countries. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: FDI Inflows from 1980 through 2007 
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Figure 2: US and German Outward FDI to the 15 Host Countries (IPR reform year 
represented by vertical lines 
Figure 2.1 
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Figure 2.3 
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Figure 2.4 
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Figure 2.5 
 
Figure 2.6 
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Figure 2.7 
 
Figure 2.8 
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Figure 2.9 
 
Figure 2.10 
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Figure 3: Correlation between Inward FDI and IPR Strength for the 15 Sample Countries 
 
Notes: IPR strength is measured using the Park (2008) index and is the five year average for the year 2000. Inward 
FDI is measured in per capita terms in real 2000 U.S. dollars. U.S. parent FDI data only is used. 
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Table 1: List of Host Countries by year of Patent Reform 
 
Country Year of Reform 
Argentina 1996 
Brazil  1997 
Chile 1991 
China 1993 
Columbia 1994 
Indonesia 1991 
Japan 1987 
Mexico 1991 
Philippines 1997 
Portugal 1992 
South Korea 1987 
Spain 1986 
Thailand 1992 
Turkey 1995 
Venezuela 1994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Branstetter (2006) 
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Table 2: Characteristics of Patent Reform Episodes 
Country 
Expansion of 
Eligible 
Inventions 
Expansion of 
Patent Scope 
Expansion of 
Patent Length
Improvement 
in Patent 
Enforcement 
Improvement 
in Patent 
Administration
Argentina X X       
Brazil  X X X X X 
Chile X   X X X 
China X X X X   
Columbia X X X X X 
Indonesia X X X X X 
Japan X X X X X 
Mexico X X   X X 
Philippines X X X X X 
Portugal X X X   X 
South Korea X X X X X 
Spain X X   X X 
Thailand X X X X   
Turkey X   X X X 
Venezuela X X X X X 
Source: Branstetter (2006)  
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Table 3: Control Variables 
 
Variable Description Source 
Expected 
Coefficient 
Interpretation
Log GDPt,i 
the logged GDP of host 
country i at time=t  
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators & 
Global 
Finance 
Database 
(+) 
Log  GDP per capitat,i 
the logged GDP of host 
country i at time=t  
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators & 
Global 
Finance 
Database 
(+) 
Trade Opennesst,i 
The balance of 
payments in host 
country i at time =t. 
Calculated: Trade 
openness=(exports-
imports)/GDP 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators & 
Global 
Finance 
Database 
(+) 
Log Real Exchange 
Ratet,i 
The average yearly real 
exchange rate between 
host country i and parent 
country (U.S or 
Germany) 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators & 
Global 
Finance 
Database 
(‐) 
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Table 4: High Income Dummy variable: High and Low Income Countries 
High Income  GDP per capita 
Japan 32,443 
Spain 32,545 
Korea 27,168 
Portugal 24,021 
Argentina 14,559 
Low Income   
Mexico* 14,337 
Chile* 14,331 
Turkey* 13,905 
Venezuela 12,341 
Brazil 10,427 
Columbia 8,870 
Thailand 8,004 
China 6,838 
Indonesia 4,205 
Philippines 3,546 
Notes: GDP per capita is listed in 2009 nominal USD. * indicates that these countries are included as low income 
countries despite ‘high income’ status according to World Bank criteria. The reason for this is because at the time of 
IPR reform, these countries had significantly lower income levels in real terms. For example, Mexico’s GDP per 
capita in the year of reform  is $5080 in real 2000 USD; Chile: $3252; and Turkey: $3571. GDP per capita figures 
listed are retrieved from the World Bank Development Indicators database. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Minimum Maximum Average ST Dev 
U.S. outward FDI (in millions) 88.00 101918.00 12956.75 17878.10 
Log U.S.FDI 4.48 11.53 8.67 1.37 
German outward FDI (in 
millions) 10.82 37318.42 3027.45 4737.10 
Log German FDI 2.38 10.53 6.90 1.68 
GDP (in millions) 29213.48 5201146.06 585982.40 1109022.30 
Log GDP 10.28 15.47 12.42 1.15 
GDP per capita 289.68 40707.00 7135.31 8630.13 
Log GDP per capita 5.67 10.61 8.31 1.09 
Log real exchange rate -19.89 9.24 1.82 4.29 
Trade Openness -0.154 0.286 0.0045 0.064 
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Table 6: United States FDI Response following IPR Reform 
Dependent Variable:   Log United States FDI Outflows 
    1  2   3  4  5 
    
Reform Dummy 1.08 2.71 1.01 0.12 0.19 
  [0.137]*** (0.232)*** [0.105]*** [0.081]* [0.074]*** 
    
LOG GDP Per Capita 0.19 0.12 1.93 2.69 
  [0.128]* [0.145] [0.456]*** [0.216]*** 
    
Trade Openness 0.63 0.59 -0.84 -1.18 
  [0.008]*** [0.009]*** [0.365]** [0.146]*** 
    
Log Real Exchange Rate 1.35 0.79 -0.77 -1.98 
  [0.850] [0.575] [0.399]* [0.447]*** 
    
Fixed Country Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Time Effects No Yes No Yes Yes 
Included Observations (1985-2008) 24 24 24 24 24 
Cross Sections (15 countries) 15 15 15 15 11 
 Total Pool Observations 344 344 344 344 264 
Balanced Pool No No No No Yes 
R-Squared   0.49  0.21   0.83  0.94  0.96 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *= statistically significant at 10%. **= statistically significant at 5% ***=statistically significant at 1% 
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Table 7: German FDI Response Following IPR Reform 
Dependent Variable:  Log Germany FDI Outflows 
  1   2  3  4 
    
Reform Dummy 1.25 2.70 1.60 0.23 
  [0.152]*** [0.362]*** [0.139]*** [0.101]** 
    
Log GDP Per Capita 0.34 0.18 -0.58 
  [0.148]** [0.194] [0.112]*** 
    
Trade Openness 0.48 0.50 0.78 
  [0.009]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** 
    
Log Real Exchange Rate -3.62 -1.77 0.24 
  [0.919]*** [0.781]** [0.451] 
    
Fixed Country Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Time Effects No Yes No Yes 
Included Observations (1985-2008) 24 24 24 24 
Cross Sections (15 host countries) 15 15 15 15 
 Total Pool Observations 356 356 356 356 
Balanced Pool No No No No 
R-Squared 0.55   0.39  0.79  0.94 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *= Statistically significant at 10%. **Statistically significant at 5%. ***Statistically significant at 1%. 
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Table 8: FDI Response Relative to Income Following IPR Reform 
Dependent Variable: Log U.S FDI Outflows  Log German FDI Outflows 
Sample: All Reforms All Reforms 
Normal 
Pool† All Reforms All Reforms All Reforms All Reforms 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
    
Reform Dummy 1.02 -0.01 0.05 0.04 1.61 0.23 1.81 
  [0.103]*** [0.090] [0.108] [0.412] [0.124]*** [0.101]** [0.468]*** 
    
Reform Dummy*High Income Dummy 0.34 0.18 0.25 -0.36 -0.58   
  [0.149]** [0.105]* [0.124]** [0.182]** [0.112]***   
    
Reform Dummy*Log GDP Per capita 0.002 -0.23 
  [0.051] [0.058]*** 
    
Log GDP 0.56 0.70 0.64 0.71 0.59 0.78 0.78 
  [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]** [0.013]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]*** 
    
Trade Openness 0.13 -0.24 -0.22 -0.34 0.31 0.24 0.23 
  [0.582] [0.402] [0.556] [0.404] [0.733] [0.452] [0.462] 
    
Log Real Exchange Rate 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.07 
  [0.014]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]** [0.010]*** [0.018] [0.012]*** [0.012]*** 
    
Fixed Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Time Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Included Observations(1985-2008) 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Cross Sections Included (15 countries) 15 15 11 15 15 15 15 
 Total Pool Observations 344 344 264 344 356 356 356 
Balanced Pool No No Yes No No No No 
R-Squared 0.84   0.93   0.94   0.93   0.83   0.94   0.94 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *Statistically significant at 10%. **Statistically significant at 5%. ***Statistically significant at 1%. † denotes normal pool data where Columbia, Indonesia, Portugal, and Venezuela are dropped from 
the sample. The high income dummy in columns 1-3 and 6-7 are derived using the criterion for high income countries derived by the World Bank. Therefore, 8 high income countries that are included in these samples. 
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